A case in which a high-ranking official was convicted of a criminal offence has led to a relativisation of the role of the judiciary. Reinterpretations of the distinctions between legal and illegal, and between legitimate and illegitimate, preceded an attempt to ideologise the reshaping of the legal reality and redefine the judiciary’s mandate. Specific forms of denying individual responsibility among officeholders to uphold the law have created political conditions conducive to establishing a new structure within an already hybrid regime.
The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found Milorad Dodik guilty of failing to comply with the decisions of the High Representative. In a second-instance, final ruling, he was sentenced to one year in prison, and issued a security measure that prohibited him from performing the duties of President of Republika Srpska for a period of six years.
Following a public hearing on 12 June 2025, the Appellate Panel of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a ruling that rejected the appeal submitted by the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the appeal by the defence of the accused, Milorad Dodik. In doing so, it upheld the first-instance verdict delivered by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 February 2025. The Panel’s written judgement was sent to the parties on 1 August 2025, accompanied by a reminder that no further appeal was permitted.
The proceedings took place because Dodik signed a decree proclaiming a law whose entry into force was blocked by Christian Schmidt, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This law prohibits the implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territory of Republika Srpska, as well as the publication of the High Representative’s decisions in the Official Gazette of Republika Srpska.
Despite being aware that these laws had been blocked from coming into force, Dodik took official actions to continue the legislative process, thereby failing to either apply or implement the High Representative’s decisions.
Additionally, on 30 June 2023, Dodik filed a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina against himself and others for non-compliance with the decision of the High Representative. He posted about this on X, stating: “This complaint will not exempt us from prosecution before the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
Qui bono?
The verdict against Dodik sparked intense political reactions and interpretations, which, despite being ideologically diverse, share an analytical flaw.
Certain officials, media figures, and socio-political actors have interpreted the judicial sanction as an indictment of a systemic pattern of political behaviour not covered by the court proceedings. This has proven to be highly dangerous.
The idea of the judiciary as a target for ideological projections – with the court just one of the places where decisions about a specific ideology are made – has been shared by numerous mass media outlets. Rather than the Dodik verdict being seen as a legal sanction for a specific criminal offence, it was interpreted as a political act that would inevitably have extended political effects. Although limited to Dodik’s non-compliance with the High Representative’s decisions, certain political movements and actors interpreted the verdict as the product of a biased arbiter – an ideological player and symbolic figure representing the “beginning of the struggle” for the instrumentalisation of the judiciary. Such reactions cover a wide spectrum, from viewing the verdict as a response to long-standing attempts to undermine the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to interpreting it as a political silencing of the (Bosnian) Serb people. Both kinds of political agitator have worked carefully to erode trust in the country’s judicial institutions. By interpreting the judiciary as an extension of political interests and treating the court as a political instrument, they have “ordered” further action and mobilisation of state and entity institutions. Using the verdict for their ideological and political goals, these actors are among many commentators on the case who have refused to treat the court’s decision as a legal act, thereby demonstrating a belief that the judicial system can also be an effective tool of political discipline.
“The will of the people”
Numerous public commentators on the verdict have presented ideologically manipulated assessments of the court proceedings. Claiming to provide insight into the legal process, they frame their commentary around dilemmas concerning the rule of law, and the influence of the international community – particularly the Office of the High Representative – on democratic governance.
Mainstream media also reported on the text of the appeal submitted by Dodik’s defence lawyer against the decision of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina to strip him of his mandate as president of the entity.
The appeal concludes: “In this case, criminal law, and consequently, the CEC’s decision, serves as an instrument of political pressure. Voters are not sheep; the truth lies in the ballot box, and actions that overturn the will of the people and fail to uphold the rule of law must be challenged by all available legal means. It is neither ethical nor lawful to, in this way, substitute the will of the majority electoral body, which values the freedom of its people and citizens over subjugation to a foreigner and the associated centres of power, in order to achieve political goals that have no basis in the legal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.”
Also reported was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’s reaction to the “situation” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This followed a meeting between Milorad Dodik and Sergey Lavrov after the closed briefing of the United Nations Security Council on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A statement from the Ministry published on 9 September 2025 reads: “In recent years, there has been a serious escalation of the internal political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, caused by increasing neo-colonial interference by the West in the internal affairs of Republika Srpska, including the efforts of the self-proclaimed High Representative, Christian Schmidt. Russia strongly condemns the West’s attempts to remove the legally elected and legitimate President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, from the political scene through dishonest methods. The unjust guilty verdict handed down in a fabricated criminal case, along with the politically motivated decision of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to strip President Dodik of his mandate, carries significant destabilising potential. Moscow is convinced of the need to return the situation to a legal and democratic framework. To achieve this, the Office of the High Representative, which is now the main source of problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, must be closed immediately, direct dialogue between Bosnian parties must be resumed, and Western interference in Bosnia’s internal affairs must be stopped.”
Publicity
Efforts to functionally reshape the judiciary have destabilised the democratic order and led to the denial of the legal framework, speculation about the affirmation or erosion of the rule of law, and attempts to nullify democratic governance. A wide range of representations of the judiciary, the democratic state, and the convicted official have emerged through numerous analyses that examine the political situation, its consequences, shifts in the political context, the impact of the verdict, and – above all – the ongoing scrutiny of Milorad Dodik’s political activity following his ban on holding public office.
While his shadowy actions and disregard for the ban on political activity are being analysed and presumed solutions to the institutional crisis debated, the scale and scope of Dodik’s political activity have overshadowed the principle of media accountability. The reaffirmation of his presence, increased visibility, and discursive rehabilitation have been perceived as a pretext for reporting on pseudo-events and quasi-phenomena.
Radiotelevizija Bosne i Hercegovine (Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina) seeks to portray Dodik’s political activity during the ban as unacceptable, but still broadcasts his political statements, speeches, and addresses. This applies not only to content relating to the verdict or his role as entity president, but also to his words as a political leader who cannot be ignored. Radio-televizija Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine (Radio and Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) takes a similar approach, with the key difference that it devotes more attention to Dodik than the state media service, thereby maintaining his image as an important political leader in the public eye. Meanwhile, Radio televizija Republike Srpske (Radio and Television of Republika Srpska) continues to present Dodik as the entity’s law-abiding president. This gives him extensive space for political promotion and even infotainment.
Although numerous media outlets have reported Dodik’s statements with critical commentary, the media portrayal of his political activity since the ban is such that we learn of his actions daily, despite the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s verdict and prohibitive measures.
Outcome
The given paradigm is based on the relativisation of individual responsibility for unlawful behaviour, and seeks to enable a parallelism between legal norms and political practices. In this case, individual legal accountability for unlawful actions is not the foundation of the legal order, but rather a subject of relativisation.
Interpreted through the lens of political utility, the legal sanction has triggered an erosion of order, whereby the incident has become a behavioural norm. By seeking to strip the legal norm of its normative function and make it a pretext for affective mobilisation, reinterpretation, and the delegitimisation of the legal system, numerous actors have attempted to affirm a regime governed by individuals. These are individuals who wish to wield the power of the community they supposedly represent, solely for their own interests, without being held accountable.
This new/old amplification of political and social factors that replaces the real hierarchy of norms with the coexistence of legal norms and political practices can be seen as a feature of a “captured state”. This case has demonstrated the concrete power of political actors to pursue their desired “judicial reform”, in which only two camps exist: one that believes law is applied to limit power, and another that believes it should (re)distribute it.