The 2026 general elections will be remembered as the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which specific electoral technologies were deployed countrywide. Biometric voter identification and authentication, optical scanning of ballot papers and electronic transmission of results were introduced to address some of the longstanding challenges in the electoral process, from identity fraud and multiple voting to ballot stuffing, the addition of votes to ballot papers and irregularities in counting.
One of the most visible changes concerns the speed at which preliminary results were published. Within the first half-hour after polling stations closed, more than 70 per cent of results had been transmitted electronically to the main centre of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CEC BiH), rising to more than 90 per cent in the following half-hour. Results for all levels of government were publicly available by 8 pm. However, the speed at which results are published does not in itself answer the question of whether the elections were fairer. Viewed more broadly, electoral integrity involves much more than technology. Technology can improve certain stages of the electoral process, but it cannot, on its own, prevent pressure on voters, vote buying, misuse of public resources, disinformation or problems in the work of the electoral administration. The experience of the 2026 general elections should therefore be examined through two parallel questions: what did technology improve, and which problems remained beyond its reach?
From Idea to Implementation: The Long Road to Technology
The introduction of specific electoral technologies in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not begin in 2026. Their potential use had been discussed for years, including through activities undertaken by the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OSCE Mission to BiH in 2022. Civil society was also strongly advocating technological improvements to the electoral process. The Pod lupom Coalition first raised the issue in 2019, while a 2021 petition in which more than 90,000 citizens supported the introduction of biometric identification and optical scanners demonstrated that electoral technologies already enjoyed considerable public support.
The legal basis for their use was established through amendments to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2024. Pilot projects were also conducted during the 2024 local elections, allowing different technological solutions to be tested under actual electoral conditions for the first time. The pilot projects played an important role, revealing both the potential and the limitations of technology. Biometric identification and authentication achieved a success rate of 93 per cent in the 2024 local elections, while ballot counting and transmission of results using optical scanners achieved a success rate of 98 per cent. The experience gained in 2024 provided the basis for moving from pilot projects to countrywide implementation. That transition, however, entailed an entirely different level of complexity: the technology now had to work simultaneously across the country, rather than at a limited number of polling stations.
Four Months for the Most Complex Electoral Technology Project
Although CEC BiH adopted the decision to implement a multi-year project introducing specific electoral technologies in 2025, implementation gathered pace after the public procurement procedure was completed and the contract with the selected bidder was signed in May 2026. At that point, approximately four months remained before the general elections. Within that period, hardware and software had to be adapted, different systems connected, integration with relevant databases ensured, equipment prepared, distributed and tested, and electoral administrators and operators trained – all while explaining changes to voting procedures to the public.
Introducing technology was therefore more than a matter of procuring devices. It had to be adapted to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s particular electoral system, voting rules, ballot paper design and existing electoral administration. The limited time available for this phase is crucial to understanding the problems that arose on election day. In its preliminary assessment, ODIHR highlighted delays and the limited time available for testing, training and voter education. The question, therefore, is not simply whether a device worked. Equally important is how much time was available to test the system, prepare the administration and ensure that voters understood the changes.
What Exactly Did the Devices Change?
To understand what technology changed in terms of electoral integrity, we need to look at what happens at different stages of voting. The biometric device operates at the very beginning of the process, before a ballot paper is issued. The voter first presents a valid identification document. The device reads its data and uses them to locate the voter in the relevant register. Once the details have been checked, the voter confirms their identity using their right index fingerprint. This procedure introduced an additional check that had not previously existed in this form. Voters’ identities are no longer confirmed solely through a document and manual verification of their details, but also through biometric authentication. At the same time, the system records that the voter has been identified and issued a ballot paper. This provides an additional mechanism for preventing voting in another person’s name and multiple voting. Once a voter has been successfully identified and recorded, the system can detect any further attempt by that voter to enter the voting process and alert the polling station committee. In other words, the biometric device’s role is to confirm that the person presenting themselves to vote is indeed the voter entitled to that ballot paper, and to record that they have already exercised their right to vote.
The optical scanner operates at the other end of the process, after the voter has marked the ballot paper. Voters still vote on paper. They mark the ballot paper by hand and then insert it into the scanner. The device reads the marks and generates an electronic result, while the ballot paper is retained in the ballot box. Its role is to create an electronic record and enable preliminary results to be established more quickly, while also providing a safeguard against manipulation such as adding ballot papers or making additional marks on them after 7 pm.
Technology Is More Than a Device
The greatest challenge was not solely technical. Countrywide implementation required thousands of people to be mobilised. Election commission members, instructors, polling station committee chairs and deputy chairs, committee members and operators all had to understand the new procedures. A particular challenge was that training took place alongside the development and adaptation of the technology. Initial training was more theoretical, while later sessions became more practical, incorporating increasing numbers of simulations, tests and materials for use at polling stations. The experience of the general elections showed that training would be one of the key lessons for the next electoral cycle – not only for electoral administrators and operators, but also for voters.
Voters Had to Learn a New Part of the Electoral Process
For voters, the change meant more than the appearance of new devices at polling stations. Part of the voting experience itself also changed. Voters confirm their identity biometrically and then, after marking their ballot paper, feed it through a scanner. The way ballot papers are marked also changed from previous electoral cycles.
On ballot papers for proportional representation elections, candidates’ names are not listed directly alongside the name of the political entity in the way voters were previously accustomed to but appear in a candidate list. Voters must mark the circle beside the name of one political entity. If they wish to express a preference, they may also select between one and three candidates from that entity’s list. This required further explanations of how to mark ballot papers correctly, demonstrating that technological reform does not end with installing and using devices, but also requires voters to adapt to new voting rules. On ballot papers for elections under the majority system, voters still vote for one candidate. Instead of marking their choice with an ‘X’ as before, voters must now fill in the circle beside their preferred option.
Election Day from the Perspective of Domestic and International Observers
On election day, technology became part of routine operations at all regular polling stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the first time. The Pod lupom Coalition recorded technical problems with biometric identification and authentication devices at 14 per cent of polling stations, while problems or interruptions in the operation of optical scanners were recorded at 21.3 per cent. Nevertheless, according to its preliminary assessment, these problems neither disrupted voting nor led to results being challenged on grounds related to the use of technology itself.
ODIHRalso recorded technical difficulties, including problems reading fingerprints, scanner stoppages and complex opening and counting procedures. This highlights one of the most important lessons of the 2026 elections: the success of technology should be measured not only by how often it works without error, but also by how the electoral system responds when an error occurs. If a device cannot read a fingerprint or a scanner temporarily stops working, the electoral process must have a clear alternative procedure established and communicated in advance.
One of the most visible changes concerns the transmission of results. CEC BiH published its first preliminary results at 8 pm, just one hour after polling stations closed. Electronic transmission allowed a large proportion of results to arrive within a short time, significantly reducing the wait for the first results. Manual counting remained part of the process in the 2026 general elections, and ODIHR recorded only minor discrepancies between manually counted and electronically transmitted results in the cases it observed.
What Did Technology Not Resolve?
Biometric identification can reduce the scope of certain types of irregularities relating to voter identity. Scanners can reduce the possibility of adding votes and stuffing ballot boxes, while also speeding up the work of the electoral administration and the publication of results. Together, these two technologies make a substantial contribution to safeguarding electoral integrity. Yet neither system can, on its own, prevent political pressure on voters before they enter the polling station. It cannot prevent vote buying; it cannot prevent the misuse of public resources; it cannot prevent premature campaigning; it cannot regulate the content of political messages on social media; it cannot ensure equal media coverage for candidates. These are precisely the problems that domestic and international observers continued to record alongside the technological changes.
Violations of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Election Law, as amended in 2024, allowed penalties to be imposed for premature campaigning, and CEC BiH issued fines for various breaches of electoral rules during the pre-election period. CEC’s official website lists separate categories for premature campaigning, spreading disinformation, misuse of children, misuse of resources, paid advertising and hate speech. According to the CEC’s register of fines, premature campaigning was by far the most common category, with fines for this type of violation totalling BAM 671,000.
Fines were also imposed for other breaches of electoral rules. According to the same register, this included spreading disinformation, misuse of children, misuse of public resources, paid political advertising and hate speech. For example, the CEC imposed fines ranging from BAM 3,000 to BAM 12,000 in individual cases of premature campaigning, while some cases involved several types of violation.
Data from Pod lupom further demonstrate the scale of the problem. During the pre-election period, the coalition recorded 528 electoral irregularities, including 206 cases each of premature campaigning and misuse of public resources. It also recorded 18 irregularities in the formation of polling station committees, 17 prohibited campaign activities, 14 cases of unlawful paid advertising, 12 cases of misuse of children for political purposes and three cases of pressure on voters.
The Need for Balanced Media Coverage
Another important dimension of the 2026 elections unfolded outside polling stations. Voters received information about candidates and political parties through television, news websites, social media and other digital channels. ODIHR highlighted the political and ethnic polarisation of the media landscape, a lack of balanced reporting in some media outlets, and problems online. Anonymous pages and profiles, clickbait content, manipulative messages, disinformation and AI-generated content added a new layer of challenges.
Technology at polling stations can make certain electoral procedures more secure and verifiable. But the information on which voters base their political decisions is produced much earlier – in the media, on social media, in political campaigns and through direct contact between candidates and voters. Electoral integrity must therefore encompass the entire electoral cycle, rather than just the few hours during which polling stations are open.
Were the Elections Any Fairer?
This question cannot be answered simply by examining the devices. If improvements in electoral integrity are assessed in terms of more reliable voter identification, reduced opportunities for multiple voting, faster transmission of results, less scope for adding ballot papers or making additional marks on them, fewer opportunities for errors when manually transcribing results, and an additional electronic record that can be checked against the paper trail, the experience of 2026 demonstrates tangible and very positive changes.
If, however, integrity is considered as a whole – from campaigning and financing, through the media and digital space, pressure on voters and breaches of electoral rules, to the work of polling station committees, voting, counting and the resolution of electoral disputes – the picture is more complex. The greatest value of the 2026 general elections therefore lies not simply in biometric devices and optical scanners reaching polling stations for the first time. The more significant change is that Bosnia and Herzegovina moved from years of discussion and piloting to the systematic use of electoral technologies.
At the same time, the experience of the first election using these technologies shows that integrity depends not only on the system put in place, but also on the people participating in it. Voters are more than users of new technology. Their understanding of electoral rules, correct marking of ballot papers, reporting of irregularities and willingness to resist pressure are all part of a broader chain that affects electoral integrity. Similarly, the conduct of candidates and political parties, polling station committee members, the media and other actors can strengthen or weaken the safeguards introduced by technology.
Technology can make some parts of the electoral process faster, more verifiable and more resilient to certain types of error and abuse. But technology alone does not produce electoral integrity. It can protect specific points in the process, but the integrity of the election depends on rules, institutions, political actors, the media and the electoral administration, as well as the conduct and responsibility of those participating in the process. The 2026 general elections were therefore not the end of electoral reform. It was a test of how far technological reform could change one part of the system, but also a reminder that trust in elections is built not only through devices, but through how people understand, use and protect the electoral process.