How Brussels Risks Undermining Serbia’s Democratization Potential

Last week, the European Commission published its official list of strategic raw materials projects within the EU, as part of efforts to secure the rare minerals needed for the green transition and to reduce its dependence on China. A second list with projects in third countries is expected in the coming days. According to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, the controversial Jadar lithium mining project will certainly be included.

However, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met Serbian President in Brussels last week, the atmosphere was noticeably colder than during their previous encounters. While the Jadar project loomed in the background, in her statement after the meeting Von der Leyen reiterated the EU’s core demands: electoral law reform, media freedom and a credible fight against corruption.

The Serbian President, meanwhile, arrived in Brussels politically cornered. The government which is de facto directly accountable to him is currently operating in a technical mandate, amid five months of intensifying domestic popular unrest. The immediate trigger for massive protests was a tragic accident at the Novi Sad train station, which left 16 people dead. The incident, linked to fixed tenders and systemic corruption, sparked massive student-led protests under the slogan: “Corruption Kills.” Hundreds of thousands have since joined the demonstrations, accusing the government of corruption and lack of accountability.

These peaceful protests have been met with disproportionate force by the government, including the alleged use of a sonic weapon, police brutality and the involvement of para-state groups in violent actions against the protestors. The government subsequently resigned, and by April 18, Serbia must either hold new elections or form a new cabinet. Opposition parties have demanded the formation of a transitional government to restore public trust and ensure free and fair elections.

From years of appeasement to ‘business as usual’

In this context, public dissatisfaction in Serbia is mounting over how the EU and its representatives are handling the crisis, particularly their failure to use clear language or express direct criticism of the government’s repressive tactics. After what many see as years of appeasing Serbia’s increasingly authoritarian president, the EU’s recent approach is widely perceived as doing business as usual at a time when the situation is anything but normal. 

In the eyes of many, the EU is not standing with those defending democracy.

This perceived complicity is taking its toll. In the eyes of many, the EU is not standing with those defending democracy, but is instead making backroom deals with those dismantling it. This is why the EU flags are almost nowhere to be seen in the streets of Serbia. And it seems that the Serbian President, well-practiced in the very transactional politics that secured his power at home, is now prepared to trade Jadar for continued European support, betting that access to much-desired lithium will outweigh any concerns about repression at home.

After initially facing backlash from pro-European segments of the Serbian public for a vague, tongue-in-cheek public statement, EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos offered a rare moment of clarity in a recent interview. She stated plainly: “What students are asking for is exactly what the European Commission is asking for.” She emphasized that the protesters’ demands for transparency, justice and institutional reform are fully aligned with the EU’s own requests.

However, she was confronted with a tough question from a Slovenian journalist, one that echoed the powerful slogan chanted by Serbian students:“Nije nadležan!” (“This is not his competence!”). The journalist asked why EU officials continue to meet with a president who holds no formal constitutional authority over many of the issues being discussed. Commissioner Kos offered a revealing response with a blunt counter-question: “If not him, then who do we talk to?”

The truth is, it really seems like there is no one else to talk to, and that that is by design, not by accident. Over the past 13 years, the Serbian President has systematically dismantled the country’s independent institutions: suppressing checks and balances, marginalizing parliament, weakening the judiciary and capturing the media. What remains is a system in which he alone functions as the guarantor of political stability, both domestically and in the eyes of international actors. It is important to understand that this is not a constitutional anomaly or the result of unstable political conditions at home. It is the product of deliberate, long-term efforts to centralize power.

This is precisely the context in which the Jadar lithium mining project is emerging as a matter of European strategic interest and is expected to be designated as a strategic project. If this happens, the European Commission highlights benefits such as access to faster permitting procedures, which are reduced to 27 months instead of the usual 5 to 10 years, as well as improved financing opportunities. Perhaps most importantly, significant political support that few other initiatives in the region enjoy. This decision will, therefore, not only determine the fate of the lithium mine but also test the integrity of the EU’s approach to enlargement, democracy and the green transition itself.

Is the EU Trading Democracy for Lithium?

For years, the EU was accused of trading democracy for stability in the Western Balkan and now it risks being blamed of trading democracy for lithium. Public opposition to the Jadar project is neither new nor marginal, since it ignited some of the largest environmental protests in Serbia to date. Tens of thousands of people blocked roads and highways, protesting not just the mine itself, but the non-transparent deals behind it and the systemic disregard for local communities affected by the project. And despite announcements of halting the project in early 2022, leaked information and continued political messaging have made it clear that efforts to revive the project never stopped. 

Then the EU became involved. First came German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič, who signed a Strategic Partnership agreement on lithium with Serbia. Although the deal was framed around sustainable practices, value chains and electric vehicles, many in Serbia saw it simply as a race for lithium at whatever local cost. And now comes the EU’s strategic projects list which, if it includes Jadar, is effectively going to provide political cover to a project many in Serbia view as damaging, both for the environment and for democracy.

The ideal-case scenario would be for the EU to refrain from granting strategic status to the Jadar project.

At this point, the ideal-case scenario would be for the EU to refrain from granting strategic status to the Jadar project. It could do so by citing well-founded concerns over democratic legitimacy, overwhelming public opposition and the institutional weakness of Serbia’s governance system. Such a decision to pause the project would create a much-needed space for genuine democratic processes to unfold. Although this remains the wisest course of action, it now appears to be the least likely.

At the other end of the spectrum lies the worst-case scenario and it is the one the ruling coalition in Serbia appears most likely to pursue. In this scenario, the “strategic” label becomes a political cover for delivering the project at any cost and it could be used as a carte blanche to bypass procedures and step up repression against dissenting voices all while pointing to Brussels as the one demanding it.

Strategic designation comes with a package of incentives: faster permitting, easier access to financing (including through the European Investment Bank EIB and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD), administrative support and even a “one-stop shop” to streamline approvals. Although it has been communicated that this status will not remove regulatory safeguards but merely streamline procedures, in practice it opens the door to fast-tracking the project and bypassing democratic checks.

The risk is not that legal procedures will be formally abolished, but that they will be ignored or rendered meaningless. In countries like Serbia, the “strategic” stamp can easily become a license to cut corners and the government has already shown a clear tendency to do exactly that when it comes to suppressing dissent and avoiding accountability. In the case of Jadar, there is a well-documented pattern of procedural abuses, non-transparent decision-making, police intimidation and smear campaigns against those opposing the project.

The conditions in Serbia should raise red flags

The most likely scenario is that the project will be given the green light, but with the EU insisting on oversight mechanisms and sending the message that fast-tracking does not mean removing red tape, but rather enforcing it more effectively and efficiently. 

However, this scenario is built on fragile assumptions and it is most likely not going to work as intended. This is not because oversight is a bad idea, but because there is no viable way to enforce it in Serbia’s current political and institutional climate. The EU should know this already. If previous reform conditions had been meaningfully implemented and enforced, we would not be facing the situation with massive protests for democracy and against corruption in the first place.

For instance, reporting done by the Center for Investigative Journalism in Serbia (CINS) has already revealed behind-the-scenes lobbying in favor of the mine at the expense of environmental protection standards. CINS published leaked emails from the Institute of Nature Conservation of Serbia, exposing how environmental conditions for the project were issued without expert approval.

Last year, the EU adopted a directive e on corporate sustainability due diligence, setting clear expectations for companies to uphold environmental standards, human rights and responsible governance throughout their global supply chains. But how will these standards be enforced in a context like Serbia? If these conditions no longer raise red flags, what exactly is the point of decoupling from China or seeking more “ethical” sourcing of critical raw materials elsewhere? The EU should be careful not to reproduce the dynamics it seeks to avoid by turning parts of its immediate neighborhood into extractive peripheries that resemble those historically exploited countries in the Global South under the guise of strategic necessity.

The regional implications of the decision on Jadar project should also be taken into account if this transactional model of doing business takes root. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska’s Milorad Dodik previously offered the entity’s mineral resources to the U.S. as part of a geopolitical bargain. Now, as he turns to Moscow amid growing international sanctions and internal scrutiny, the risks of treating critical raw materials as political currency in fragile democracies should become clear. 

The EU’s credibility in the Western Balkans has always rested on the claim that it represents more than just economic integration, that it stands for a values-based and rules-based system. But this credibility is crumbling as the EU’s approach to enlargement in the Western Balkan region has increasingly shifted from transformational to transactional - focused on short-term stability and strategic gains, while overlooking the erosion of democracy, rule of law and civic space.

 The designation of Jadar as a strategic project must not become a tool to bypass environmental, legal or participatory safeguards.

A Critical Choice on Critical Materials

There is still time for the EU to course-correct and to demonstrate that its support for the green transition does not come at the cost of democratic transition. The designation of Jadar as a strategic project must not become a tool to bypass environmental, legal or participatory safeguards. Instead, it should be used as an opportunity to reinforce democratic principles, not compromise them.

To do so:

• The EU should defer its decision on granting strategic status to the Jadar project until a democratic mandate is re-established in Serbia, and space is created for meaningful public debate, legal review and civic participation. Doing so would send a clear message: procedural legitimacy is not optional, but rather fundamental to any partnership grounded in democratic values.
• If the project is greenlit, the EU must publicly reaffirm that “strategic” does not mean “exempt from oversight”, and make clear that all transparency, environmental and public participation standards must be upheld in full. Strategic status must never serve as a shortcut around democracy.
• Any financial support must be strictly conditional on independent monitoring, civic engagement and legal compliance. Serbian government assurances alone are not enough.
• Most importantly, the EU must recommit to a transformational vision of enlargement, one that supports bottom-up democratization, invests in youth and civil society, and treats citizens not as obstacles to strategy but as its core stakeholders.

If the EU loses its normative compass for the Jadar project, the Jadar project may turn out to be “strategic” in a very different way, a strategic error, one that deepened authoritarianism, discredited the EU in the eyes of those who should be its closest allies and turned the promise of partnership into a symbol of betrayal.

In the end, it boils down to this: the EU must decide whether it wants to continue making strategic transactions with elites or commit to building transformational partnerships with citizens.