The Western Balkans 6 Strategy Group's visit to Brussels (16–18 November 2026) will explore how the EU can reconcile its geopolitical ambitions with democratic conditionality, move beyond managing regional stability to support democratic resilience, and ensure a credible path to full EU membership.
The visit follows significant political developments across the region: elections in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), raising important questions about the potential for democratic change and the resilience of entrenched power; renewed institutional functioning in Kosovo after a prolonged political deadlock; concerns over rule of law and environmental safeguards in Albania, amid growing civic mobilisation; Montenegro's advancing accession negotiations; and North Macedonia's continued blockade over bilateral disputes with EU member states. These developments, together with the European Commission's 2026 Enlargement Package and pre-enlargement policy review: „Preparing for a Wider Union“, bring renewed attention to the future of enlargement.
Russia's war against Ukraine has returned enlargement to the centre of the EU's geopolitical agenda, making it a question not only of preparing candidate countries for membership but also of preparing the Union for a changing geopolitical reality. Debates on gradual integration, voting rights, institutional safeguards and the next Multiannual Financial Framework, alongside shifting transatlantic relations, raise fundamental questions about the future shape of membership. The challenge is to accelerate enlargement without weakening democratic standards, creating second-tier members or undermining the credibility of the process.
Key Discussion Points
1. Preserving the credibility of full EU membership
Proposals for gradual integration, limitations on voting rights and stronger post-accession safeguards could advance enlargement but also risk creating different categories of membership. Full membership must remain the clear endpoint, with any transitional arrangements transparent and legally grounded. Accelerating accession, particularly for front-runners Montenegro and Albania, must not compromise substantive reforms, and benchmarking must include zero-tolerance for legislative rollbacks in the nature protection area. The EU must also prepare for enlargement both institutionally and regionally, ensuring that the accession of individual Western Balkan countries does not create new divisions, weaken regional cooperation or leave the remaining candidates further behind.
2. Moving from stability management to democratic partnership
EU engagement continues to rely heavily on incumbent leaders, including those associated with democratic backsliding and state capture. Recent elections and political developments in Serbia and BiH highlight both the democratic potential of grassroots civic mobilisation and the resilience of entrenched power structures. These developments call for stronger EU partnerships with democratic movements, civil society, independent media and reform-oriented political actors, alongside clearer criteria for reassessing engagement with governments that repeatedly undermine democratic competition, fundamental rights and institutional independence. This also raises the question of introducing qualified majority voting for EU restrictive measures to prevent individual member states from blocking collective action.
3. Making democratic conditionality credible and consistent
Uneven responses to democratic backsliding and political obstruction undermine public confidence in enlargement. The EU needs greater consistency across political engagement, restrictive measures, accession decisions, and financial conditionality, including where EU responses differ from those of international partners. The Growth Plan and Reform Agendas should deliver independently verified reforms rather than formal legislative compliance, particularly in addressing state capture. Where domestic political obstruction limits access to existing instruments, as in BiH under the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF), the EU should provide alternative channels of support for democratic actors and ensure future reform frameworks are not weakened by concessions to anti-EU forces. The next Multiannual Financial Framework also offers an opportunity to strengthen predictable, direct support for civil society, independent media and other democratic actors, especially in countries experiencing democratic backsliding.
4. Aligning geopolitical and economic partnerships with EU standards
Growing geopolitical competition and shifting transatlantic relations could weaken EU leverage in the region. Diverging US and EU approaches to international engagement in BiH, alongside the growing US emphasis on energy security and bilateral partnerships, raise questions about their implications for enlargement. Competing external partnerships could further weaken incentives for alignment with EU standards, particularly if strategic investments in energy, infrastructure and critical resources are not accompanied by robust environmental safeguards, transparency and good governance. These investments must also comply with EU environmental and biodiversity protection standards, including Natura 2000 principles, and avoid damaging biodiversity hotspots, wildlife migration corridors and key biodiversity areas. The EU should engage Washington more systematically on its involvement in candidate countries, ensuring that strategic investments and bilateral partnerships reinforce rather than undermine EU standards.
5. Reducing bilateral obstruction and restoring merit-based accession
Bilateral disputes continue to undermine the credibility of enlargement, particularly in North Macedonia, while unresolved relations between Serbia and Kosovo remain a major obstacle to their European integration. Greater use of qualified majority voting for intermediary accession decisions could help limit bilateral vetoes and restore merit-based progress, while preserving requirements for regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. Renewed momentum in the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue and implementation of existing agreements remain essential, but their respective EU integration prospects should not be reduced to the dialogue alone.