From External Stabilization to Democratic Resilience: Germany and the Western Balkans

Germany’s Changing Role

Under the new government, Germany has reaffirmed its support for EU enlargement but framed it as a gradual, conditional process limited to countries that demonstrate concrete reform results. The Coalition Agreement from April 2025 mentions twice that the further EU enlargement has to go hand in hand with internal EU reforms, even explicitly advocating for a staged/phased accession approach. Germany’s commitment through the Berlin Process as the catalyst for the enlargement remains strong. At the minister-level meeting of the Berlin Process in Belfast this October, German Foreign Minister stated that if waiting for too long, the Western Balkans citizens will lose confidence, which could invite foreign malign influences to fill in the gap. Berlin’s current approach reflects both domestic skepticism, as evidenced by Eurobarometer’s poll on support for enlargement where Germany sits at the bottom of the list, and a determination to maintain the credibility of the EU project. 

Democracy, Stability and Security

Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s security architecture, prompting a historic increase in defense spending and renewed focus on NATO’s eastern flank. Yet this reorientation also requires difficult choices about where and how Europe invests its strategic attention. In this context, the Western Balkans represent low-hanging fruit: a region where limited, well-targeted political engagement could deliver disproportionate strategic returns. By helping the Western Balkans move from externally managed stability to genuine democratic development, the EU can free up resources for broader security commitments elsewhere while simultaneously strengthening Europe’s southeastern flank. A credible, democratic Western Balkans anchored in the EU would not only reduce the need for long-term international presence but also serve as a buffer against malign influence and a partner in regional and global security efforts.

For these reasons, Germany’s approach should evolve from one focused on maintaining stability to partnership-building, recognizing that the Western Balkans are contributors to European and transatlantic security. Countries of the region already contribute to burden sharing: as NATO members, some participate in peacekeeping missions, whereas Serbia has deployed civilians to EU peace operations. Therefore, the challenge is not capability but credibility: democratic erosion, politicized media and captured institutions undermine both domestic legitimacy and the EU’s enlargement narrative.

Berlin also has the leverage to drive this shift. For the first time in years, the Chancellery, Foreign Office and Ministry of Economy are all led by CDU officials, placing the Western Balkans portfolio firmly in the hands of Germany’s strongest party. Moreover, the CDU’s broader influence within the European People’s Party (EPP), which continues to dominate EU institutions and has influential member parties from the WB region, means bearing much of the responsibility for what happens next.

Berlin’s new strategy should therefore link security cooperation with democratic accountability. That means conditioning assistance, partnerships and Berlin Process benefits on concrete democratic reforms. A democracy strong at home is the best guarantee of stability abroad: anything less risks perpetuating the region’s image as Europe’s permanent protectorate rather than its strategic partner. 

Actionable Recommendations:

• From stability to democracy: Germany should lead a shift in EU policy from managing risks to empowering democratic institutions, recognizing that stability built on accountability is more sustainable than stability maintained through political bargains. Free and fair elections and independent media are the most basic indicators of democracy, yet they remain under threat across much of the region. Prioritize engagement with pro-democratic actors: political movements, civil society organizations and independent media, rather than treating entrenched elites as the sole interlocutors.
• Ensure credibility of the EU enlargement process: It is essential to address the use of bilateral disputes as political leverage to block candidate countries and consider introducing Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for technical enlargement decisions during the negotiations. This would help prevent individual member states from blocking progress for reasons unrelated to accession criteria, ensuring that advancement is based on merit and alignment with EU standards rather than political bargaining.
• Invest political capital where reforms deliver: Prioritize support for reform-minded governments in Albania and Montenegro to demonstrate that progress is rewarded and enlargement remains a merit-based process. At the same time, this should not allow fast-tracking reforms, as is the case with Albania seeking various derogations in its negotiating framework, including key areas such as environment or food safety standards. Coupled with the potential offer of EU membership without full voting rights, a proposal quickly endorsed by some of the leaders in the region, this risks diluting reform pressure and weakening conditionality while at the same time requiring post-accession accountability mechanisms (e.g. like previously CVM was used for more than 15 years).
• Condition partnerships on democratic standards: Link Berlin Process benefits, bilateral assistance and high-level political engagement to tangible progress in electoral integrity and media freedoms, especially in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This could include integrating conditionality at both bilateral and EU levels, linking high-level contacts with BiH actors such as HDZ and SNSD to demonstrable reform progress, or in Serbia with SNS and SPS.
• Ensure coherence in the EU’s sanctions policy: Better coordination in targeted measures across the Western Balkans is needed to maintain credibility. While the European Parliament has recently called for such measures against Serbian leadership, restrictive measures against Kosovo remain in place even after the smooth and peaceful organization of local elections in the northern municipalities. These measures no longer serve their original purpose and instead hinder Kosovo’s internal reform progress and EU integration process. At the same time, the lack of a coordinated EU response after Milorad Dodik lifted US-imposed sanctions on himself and his associates further illustrates the uneven approach, where pragmatism towards obstructionists only has the potential to reinforce authoritarian tendencies and harms citizens’ interest.
• Use the CDU–EPP leverage responsibly: Germany is uniquely positioned to set the tone for a credible, values-based enlargement policy that strengthens Europe from its periphery inward. The experience with illiberal actors, such as Fidesz in Hungary or Serbia’s SNS, show how partisan affiliation can be used to undermine the EU’s credibility. Political families shape not only institutions, but also norms and governance standards, which is why they should promote democratic values instead of shielding those who undermine them. On the other hand, the CDU-EPP leverage could also be a powerful instrument to facilitate the much needed contacts between North Macedonia and Bulgaria given the current constellation of the governments in both countries.