Resisting Gender Equality: Unmasking the Dynamics of the Anti-Gender Opposition

keynote speech

It took a decade for this made-up idea of “gender ideology” to gain traction, inspiring large-scale mobilizations. Only after the economic recession in the first decade of the new millennium, after the “migrant crisis” and after the rise of populist politics, the time was ripe for the idea of “gender ideology” to gain mobilizing power.

Roman Kuhar
Teaser Image Caption
Photo by Jože Petrak Zajc

This text is the opening speech at the Gender Summit in Skopje, 4 October 2023.

Introduction

I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to participate in this esteemed Gender Summit in Skopje. It is with a sense of honor that I address you today, but at the same time, I regret that we have to start with bad news: we are confronted with the depressing reality of anti-gender mobilization, which cannot be dismissed as a minor roadblock to equality politics. This phenomenon represents not merely a continuation of traditional conservative resistance to gender equality and sexual rights, but rather, it embodies a novel form of opposition. It is characterized by innovative organizational structures, modes of mobilization, and discourses aimed at engaging a wider audience beyond the conventional conservative circles.

Roman Kuhar - Resisting Gender Equality: Unmasking the Dynamics of the Anti-Gender Opposition - Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Sarajevo

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Some time ago, I saw a picture of an elderly protester at a protest in the US against restrictions on abortion rights. She was holding a banner that read: “I can’t believe I still have to protest this fucking shit”. Although the sight of this banner may at first bring a smile to our faces, it is certainly a bitter one. It expresses a disbelief that the fight for rights, once thought secure, continues unabated. This situation underscores a harsh truth: rights and liberties are never permanently secured. Although we have often repeated this claim, we nevertheless seemed to believe that we are on an unstoppable path towards “full” gender equality and sexual rights. But this is not the case. We are currently witnessing the rise of a potent neoconservative opposition, coalescing under the nebulous concept of “gender ideology” or “gender theory” or even “genderism”, as it is variably termed.

In the limited time available to me, my goal today is to provide a brief overview of what constitutes “gender ideology”, identify the key actors in this movement, explore their strategies, and attempt to elucidate the success of these movements. Additionally, I aim to introduce some theoretical concepts to better comprehend and rationalize these perplexing mobilizations. I will rely here in particular on a comparative study that my colleague David Paternotte and I – together with a group of scholars from all over Europe – put together in 2017, called "Anti-gender campaigns in Europe" (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017).

What is gender ideology?

We are all likely familiar with the images of anti-gender protests – spanning from Eastern to Western Europe and beyond. A common thread uniting these demonstrations is the perceived threat of “gender ideology.”

So, what exactly is “gender ideology” or “gender theory”? This idea represents a contemporary form of resistance to progressive gender and sexual politics, encompassing debates around intimate or sexual citizenship (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017). It is a contrived notion, an “empty signifier” (Mayer & Sauer, 2017) that encompasses everything from marriage equality and sex education to reproductive and adoption rights, abortion, transgender rights and equality politics in general. It also challenges the legitimacy of gender studies, dismissing them as unscientific and a waste of public resources, and often extends its critique to democracy itself.

Proponents of gender ideology, however, offer a different definition. Catholic intellectual Tony Anatrella describes “gender ideology” as a neo-colonial project where the “decadent West” imposes its gender delusions globally. Similarly, Polish Bishop Pieroner infamously stated that “gender ideology” is more detrimental than communism and Nazism combined (Graff & Korolczuk, 2022b).

In common discourse, “gender ideology” has evolved into a synonym for a conspiracy theory, perceived as the ideological underpinning of contentious social reforms. These reforms are accused of denying biological realities and promoting gender fluidity, framing “gender theory” as a form of social engineering.

Often labeled as a new form of Marxism, or “Marxism 2.0,” “gender ideology” is seen as shifting the battleground from class struggle to the dynamics between men and women, representing a typical hegemonic conflict over which worldview will prevail (Kuhar, 2017; Paternotte & Verloo, 2021).

In the narrative of anti-gender activists, this hegemonic struggle is primarily cultural. The problem, as they see it, lies with the elites, often labeled the “caviar left,” who align with minorities and rely on obscure language, political correctness, and “woke culture,” while neglecting the “silent majority” and deeming traditional family structures as regressive. It is crucial to recognize that the anti-gender mobilization, while targeting gender equality, is part of a broader agenda to establish a new, less liberal, and less democratic social order(Grzebalska et al., 2017a; Kováts & Põim, 2015).

The roots of anti-gender mobilizations

Tracing the roots of anti-gender ideas reveals a complex history. The term “gender ideology” emerged in the mid-1990s, particularly after the United Nations conferences on population and women. These conferences marked a shift from the essentialist term “sex” to “gender,” emphasizing societal, cultural, and normative constructions over biological differences. This shift led to a clash between feminist advocacy for gender equality and the Vatican’s promotion of the complementarity of sexes, rooted in inherent biological differences and traditional gender roles. In Vatican’s interpretation both men and women deserve equal respect, but they are not equal (Case, 2011, 2016).

Despite the Vatican’s efforts, sexual and reproductive rights and the concept of gender equality as such were incorporated into United Nations documents and later EU policies, a development the Vatican perceived as a diplomatic failure. Later theological debates within Catholic intellectual circles, notably driven by Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope), laid the groundwork for framing “gender ideology” as a threat to humanity (O’Leary, 1995, 1997).

It took a decade for this made-up idea of “gender ideology” to gain traction, inspiring large-scale mobilizations. Only after the economic recession in the first decade of the new millennium, after the “migrant crisis” and after the rise of populist politics, the time was ripe for the idea of “gender ideology” to gain mobilizing power. For instance, protests in France against the Hollande government’s push for marriage equality in 2012/2013 marked a turning point, bringing “gender theory” and “gender ideology” into mainstream discourse.

Anti-gender actors

The actors behind anti-gender mobilizations are diverse, extending beyond religious circles. Each country exhibits a complex constellation of actors, including newly established organizations of “concerned citizens” or “concerned parents”, traditional family associations, pro-life groups, radical nationalist parties, right-wing populists, and more. In some instances, these movements have evolved into political parties, and in countries like Brazil, Hungary, and Poland, anti-gender ideology has become part of official state politics. Supporters of the movement span various sectors, including media, business, and academia (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017).

It's noteworthy that these networks often revolve around a small core of interconnected individuals. In some cases, women are placed in leadership roles, presenting themselves as defenders of traditional motherhood. Intriguingly, in France, an openly gay man co-led an anti-gender organization, challenging the notion of full marriage equality.

In conclusion, understanding the multifaceted nature of anti-gender mobilizations requires a nuanced approach, recognizing the complex interplay of actors, ideologies, and societal dynamics at play. As we delve deeper into this topic, it becomes evident that the struggle against gender ideology is not just a battle over specific rights or policies, but a broader contestation over the very fabric of our social order.

In our quest to comprehend the cohesion and functionality of the diverse actors within the anti-gender movement, two theoretical concepts offer insightful perspectives. Kováts and Põim (2015) posit that gender functions as a “symbolic glue,” unifying these actors despite their varied ideological standpoints. The notion of “gender ideology” serves as a collective framework, amalgamating disparate discourses into a singular, formidable threat to which different actors can relate and connect. Graff and Korolczuk (2022), on the other hand, describe these networks as “opportunistic synergies.” Here, actors coalesce and adopt anti-gender rhetoric to bolster their popularity, positioning themselves as champions of the common people.

A visual examination of the logos used in anti-gender campaigns reveals striking similarities. Typically, these logos depict what is perceived as a “natural family,” usually consisting of a heterosexual couple with two children – a boy and a girl. Notably, Russian and, more recently, Mexican campaigns deviate slightly, featuring three children. Other logos employ the imagery of a hand, symbolically protecting children from the perceived threats of gender ideolog

Picture 1 – Logos of anti-gender organizations

Picture 1 – Logos of anti-gender organizations

 

Anti-gender strategies

Turning to the strategies employed by these movements, we observe a multifaceted approach. Time constraints preclude a detailed analysis, but a brief overview of key strategies is instructive. Firstly, the anti-gender movement adeptly presents itself as modern, youthful, and trendy, marking a generational shift in conservative opposition. The adept use of social media is a hallmark of their approach, coupled with a discourse steeped in what Ruth Wodak (2015) terms the “politics of fear” – a strategic deployment of language, symbols, and narratives to evoke a sense of threat, insecurity, or crisis. A recurring motif in their discourse is the “innocent child,” symbolizing the family and the nation, which are central to anti-gender rhetoric.

Moreover, these movements often co-opt concepts from progressive social movements, particularly in their references to human rights. They frame their freedom of speech and religious practice as being under threat.

A notable tactic is self-victimization, portraying themselves as the true defenders of an oppressed majority – a silent or even silenced group – by powerful lobbies and elites. They position themselves as rational, reasonable actors compelled to speak out as things have purportedly “gone too far.” They also cast themselves as protectors of national authenticity, standing against international influences. This narrative not only portrays them as victims but also suggests that the marginalized “silent majority” has a significant voice. The professionalization of their activism is evident, encompassing strategic litigation and lobbying, underscoring the transnational nature of the movement (Graff & Korolczuk, 2022a; Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017).

To illustrate these (discursive) strategies in practice, consider a recent TV debate on the Euro Pride parade in Belgrade in 2022. Boško Obradović, a Serbian politician and leader of the right-wing political party Dveri, employed typical anti-gender rhetoric in his interview on Prva TV in the morning show Jutro[1] on August 29, 2022:

Transcript

 

Strategy

 

Let me first say a few basic things. As you can see, we are talking. We are talking normally.

Advocating for a moderate stance: This strategy involves positioning oneself as a voice of reason and normalcy, avoiding radical views. It emphasizes a middle-of-the-road approach, suggesting that the advocated positions are sensible and mainstream.

 

Every day you (the organizers of the Pride Parade) are guests on all TV shows in Serbia. This is the first time I have been on TV to talk about it. You have the right to form a political organization and win the elections. Then you can form the government. But you cannot impose anything on us.

 

Creating a dichotomy of us vs. them: This approach involves framing the situation as a conflict between “us” and “them”, often involving self-victimization. It asserts that the true victims are not the others but the group using this strategy, who feel oppressed or unfairly treated by the actions or beliefs of others.

Secondly, if you want to solve things democratically – and you do – then let us have a referendum. Let us ask the citizens of Serbia whether they are in favor of organizing the parade or not. If a majority wants something, you cannot force something on us as a minority.

 

Exploiting democratic processes for undemocratic aims: This tactic involves using democratic tools, such as referendums, to achieve goals that undermine democratic principles, like determining who is entitled to human rights. This strategy contradicts the fundamental principle of human rights, which is to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority.

 

Let me explain the basic thing they do not want to tell us: sexual orientation is not a human right. It’s about privacy, and we have no control over that. Do not talk about something that has nothing to do with human rights.

 

Co-opting human rights discourse: This method uses the language and framework of human rights to suggest that the rights of a particular group are being threatened by a specific social minority. It manipulates human rights discourse to create a sense of injustice or threat among the group using this strategy.

 

Secondly, they go even further than promoting homosexuality. Their next idea is gender change. Gender ideology, transgenderism ... In Germany and the USA, laws are currently being passed that allow children not to determine their gender until they are 14 years old. And then they decide whether they are male or female, regardless of their biological sex. Do you know what that means? Sex reassignment surgery, hormone therapies, gender identity crisis in young people... 

 

The use of conspiracy theories: This strategy involves references to a hidden plan, i. e. “gender ideology”, which is presented as a conspiracy theory, often involving apocalyptic visions of societal collapse. This strategy is marked by claims of catastrophic outcomes, threatening the existing social order and the end of the world as we know it.

They are forcing this on us, promoting it and believing they can do this to our children. We will not allow our children to be brainwashed like this in kindergartens and schools!

 

Utilizing the image of children to incite moral panic: This strategy involves raising concerns about "our" children’s welfare in order to incite moral panic. It is characterized by the portrayal of children as being under threat from certain ideologies or groups, and by consequence our families and our nation are also endangered.  

 

Reasons for the success of the anti-gender movement

A thorough analysis is needed to explain the larger structural factors that support the effectiveness of anti-gender mobilization, which we do not have enough time to do today. However, let me briefly outline some of the primary factors. The ascendancy of the anti-gender project can be interpreted as a reaction to at least four interrelated crises: the crisis of liberal democracy and the ramifications of neoliberalism, the crisis of masculinity, the crisis of equality, and the crisis of knowledge.

Contemporary research predominantly associates the anti-gender movement and its ideology with the adverse economic and social impacts of neoliberalism (Bogaards & Pető, 2022; Grzebalska et al., 2017b; Pető, 2021; Zacharenko, 2019). The erosion of the welfare state and robust social policies is believed to have provided fertile ground for anti-gender discourse, particularly among those marginalized by neoliberal policies. Participation in the anti-gender movement offers these individuals a newfound sense of agency (Graff & Korolczuk, 2022b). In this context, anti-genderism is intimately linked to right-wing populism, which similarly capitalizes on the fears and anxieties spawned by neoliberal politics. Both ideologies thrive on the perceived dichotomy between the elites and the populace.

Another perspective views the rise of the anti-gender movement as a response to a perceived “crisis of masculinity” (Sauer, 2020). Certain men are regarded as the casualties of equality politics. This manifests in various forms, ranging from the belief that boys are disadvantaged in educational settings due to female teachers and gender equality policies, to concerns over the perceived threats to heterosexual men from the normalization and legal protection of homosexuality, and the notion that migrant workers are usurping “our” jobs. Consequently, the anti-gender movement is often seen as an endeavor to reestablish the traditional patriarchal role of men.

This leads to another explanation for the movement’s success, which can be termed as “equality fatigue” (Kuhar & Antić Gaber, 2022; Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017). This concept refers to a sense of saturation with ongoing equality politics, “woke culture,” and political correctness, perceived as excessive. Under this view, equality is believed to have been already achieved, and the current focus on gender and sexuality is seen as a push for special, rather than equal rights.

Lastly, we confront an epistemic crisis – a growing skepticism towards science, especially the social sciences. This crisis is partly fueled by anti-gender actors who challenge not only political but also epistemic authority (Graff & Korolczuk, 2022b; Paternotte & Verloo, 2021). Their alternative knowledge production is a key political strategy. Consequently, gender studies departments and programs at universities have been targeted and maligned as bastions of “gender ideology” and unscientific endeavors, purportedly squandering public funds.

Conclusion

The initial surge of anti-gender protests coincided with the economic crisis, stringent austerity measures, and the rise of populism in Europe, reinforcing the narrative of a divide between the elites and the common people. In this “new reality”, the anti-gender movement, with its emphasis on corrupt elites, offers the allure of a better future – a future, however, rooted in a return to a perceived natural order of the past. The future is … in the past.

In his final book, Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman, 2017) referred to these nostalgic aspirations as “retrotopias,” suggesting that contemporary utopian dreams are oriented towards an idealized past rather than an improved future. The anti-gender movement epitomizes this retrotopian project. However, despite the mythical nature of this past, it would be imprudent to dismiss the neoconservative opposition to gender equality as an unreal threat to equality politics.

Nevertheless, the triumph of the anti-gender movement should not lead us to despair or a defensive stance. Instead, it presents an opportunity for feminism and LGBT activism to introspect and confront current challenges. It is imperative to move beyond the notion that equality politics align with neoliberalism. In the 21st century, feminism should pivot towards forging new realms of freedom anchored in robust social values, fostering solidarity, and building expansive alliances with other progressive movements.

Thank you.


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[1] The video is available on the official Prva YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIikW3jAZyw (December 13, 2023).