In order to fully understand the current and explosive situation with the newest phase in the relations between Serbia, Kosovo, and the role of the international community in all of that – primarily the USA and the EU – but likewise the consequences on the state of the region, and especially regarding the border situation, one needs to also consider the development to date of that whole “case."
A dangerous game with borders
In order to fully understand the current and explosive situation with the newest phase in the relations between Serbia, Kosovo, and the role of the international community in all of that – primarily the USA and the EU – but likewise the consequences on the state of the region, and especially regarding the border situation, one needs to also consider the development to date of that whole “case."
The issue of Kosovo’s independence is as old as Kosovo in Yugoslavia. That issue surfaced completely in a radical way by the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. From a mere dream and desire of Kosovars for independence, to the majority in Serbia getting accustomed to the fact that "Kosovo no longer is Serbia, really." Thereby, it seemed logical that Priština and Belgrade have completely opposing views on what this reality means in the practical sense and what it will lead to. In a "process" which unfolds intermittently and in hot-cold waves, each of them has its own version. At the same time in Brussels, from where the so-called “Brussels Process” is directed formally, but completely unsuccessfully, there is a complete lack of precision in the interpretation of the crucial question – what really needs to be done concretely in order to follow this issue through. And how this end is supposed to look like.
Along the notorious fact that in politics there most frequently is no unfilled space, many others from the closest, and also the slightly remote neighbourhood, have entered the generated vacuum of undefined Serbian-Kosovar relations. Directly or indirectly. Everyone starting from their own interests along with referring to “principles" which are addressed to Belgrade or Priština, and being charged as a great alibi for (ab)use on home turf. In Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, up to Greece. Even among individual EU countries, in which any ambition towards neighbouring territories is not quite alien. The USA with its own calculation provides this process with its special stamp. In the coordination with the EU, they see the “main danger” to the region’s stability in Russia on this occasion as well.
In previous analyses regarding this issue, especially among analysts knowing the situation, mainly the following statements have crystallised, prior to the adoption of the so-called “Platform for negotiations with Serbia" in the Kosovo Parliament on March 7, 2019:
- The internal dialogue between Belgrade and Priština has practically been discontinued; the Government of Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj has radicalised the whole process by introducing custom duties of 100 percent on merchandise imported from Serbia and BiH; The formation of a “Kosovo Army" has been proclaimed, practically by just changing the name of the existing Kosovo Security Force (BSK), but with deep psychological effects on the relations between Belgrade and Priština; the Brussels process is completely slowed down and certainly inefficient up to a critical point; the EU demonstrates a lack of will and capacities to “dynamise” the process more energetically, at least up to the minimum necessity; Both sides are buying time and preparing for early elections in order to create a new reality for continuing their plans in 2019 as well; In the EU as well, among some functionaries, as well as the positions of single states, one can discern the influence of the approaching election, by placing the issues of "Kosovo" in the context of positioning for these elections; President Vučić has completely excluded the public in Serbia with the closest leadership of his party and the state, and confined decision making to the narrow circle around himself; Priština is loudly and even triumphantly counting with an even stronger support of the USA in the process of their final international recognition and the "separation" from Serbia; Multiple attempts from the top of the EU, but also suggestions in that direction from Washington, that Kosovo should abolish the custom duties imposed on Serbia (BiH is a collateral damage regarding relations between Serbia and Republika Srpska), have failed, and Haradinaj’s response is persistent and radical: Once Serbia officially recognises Kosovo as a state, we shall discuss custom duties! In the absolutely unbending position of Haradinaj with regard to this, many analysts in the region see the direct influence from London.
After a series of real and fake attempts to make a few steps closer to the goal, based on an internal dialogue and implementing the so-called Brussels dialogue, the number of options with regard to solving the problem of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, before the "Platform" from Priština, was reduced to the following three: the demarcation between Serbs and Albanians, the status quo as politics, i. e. the “frozen conflict,“ or the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Thereby, only a few analysts were able to specify what actually is understood by the “normalisation of relations.”
The two Presidents, Vučić and Tači, have “understood” each other at first with regard to the idea on demarcation and the “exchange of territories” in the north of Kosovo for some municipalities in the south of Serbia. They believed that Serbia will protect the Serbs in Kosovo thereby, and that Kosovo will obtain territorial compensation with the majority of Kosovars historically residing in these municipalities in the South of Serbia, along the border with Kosovo. Few of them took in consideration at that moment the enormous danger for the region, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, from any sort of "opening" borders in the Balkans. The chain reaction in annulling the principles of the Badinter Arbitration Committee after the dissolution of Yugoslavia would have probably sparked new bloody conflicts. Still, also beside the support of the initial agreement between Vučić and Tači on this from various sides, especially from America, even from parts of structures in the EU, analyses have shown that arguments against an exchange of territories have prevailed, and for the continuation of the “normalisation” attempt. Thereby, it is pretty unclear what all this entails. At the same time, it is also quite obvious that many of these questions are regularly being interpreted in completely different ways in Belgrade and Priština. This is also why the other option, the one preferring the status quo has become the more desirable option with many, although not all.
In that circle movement, the public has, before the “Platform," been provided with allegedly joint “Recommendations for leaving the blockade of dialogue.” Shortly, they set out from the following:
- From the perspective of EU representatives, “the engagement of the parties in the implementation of what has been agreed is insufficient.” A typical formulation of Brussels bureaucrats unready for any sort of firm and definitive decisions by which not everyone needs to be pleased.
- From the perspective of the public, the Brussels dialogue is in a “critical phase,“ and it should be revived. Naturally, this requires the beginning of tackling numerous political, economic and safety problems which arose earlier, and during the so-called dialogue crisis. For instance, issues of vehicle registration plates, regulating the transit, the question of various certificates, declarations, permits and the like, the activation of police forces and the Prosecutor’s Office in implementing the rule of law... Everything that has remained unrealised so far.
It is certain that such a situation has removed Serbia and Kosovo from an agreement, deepened distrust, but also provoked accusations from the “other side” anew. To say nothing on the new economic and safety problems.
The behaviour of one side and the responses of the other have carried in themselves at least two important dangers in the already created crisis and relationships of distrust. One has already been recognised since early 2019 in the influence of the “Kosovo crisis” on the additional complications of the already complex relationships between the other states in the region. And secondly, this crisis has boded the loss of control and spilling over into safety incidents and large-scale conflicts. The less dangerous consequence of all of this in the short run was that Serbia and Kosovo might go into isolation, and much more dangerous and thus more realistic was that they also might ignite changes for the serious destabilisation of the whole area, in which the interests of the NATO, America, Russia, the European Union, and also Turkey are intertwined, and where everyone has their own interests.
Serbia and Kosovo could in no way have solved the on-going crisis one-sidedly. Everyone who rationally judged the situation agreed in that. The reality was that Kosovo cannot abandon this crisis by the one-sided recognition of statehood by Serbia, but also that Serbia cannot do much for the Serbian community in Kosovo (if that really is the primary goal), unless it cooperates with the Kosovo authorities. And besides that, it was obvious that it is not realistic to expect that the final phase of the dialogues will be entered before the EU elections and the new convocation of the European Commission. Unfortunately, another oversight has been made which is important for the elections in the EU: The “Kosovo crisis” has presented itself in the behaviour of many from the EU structures, from the political top to the administration, as a very favourable ground for "European" election calculations, along with all known methods with regard to this – backstage “mathematics," producing instability or artificial protraction, deals, arrangements etc.
It has been clear for a long time that Serbia’s leadership needs to unequivocally decide on its „European future,“ and thereby also regarding what could be considered as further serious participation in the Brussels dialogue. Unfortunately, it is obvious that the radical decision of the Kosovo Parliament to face Serbia with a fait accompli by passing the “Platform for negotiations" only provides arguments for Vučić to further delay the whole issue against a “normalisation of the relationships between Serbia and Kosovo". Even along with sacrificing the continuation of the integration process of Serbia into the EU. In Priština at this time, in all likelihood, the radical line prevails that does not really reflect reality, whereby in Belgrade still no one could accept the one-sided recognition of Kosovo’s full independence without it being completely devastating for the person signing it in Serbia. Equally so, renewing the Brussels dialogue in a new way without a dilemma must include into the agenda a topic which has already imposed itself during the last period, which is the issue of Kosovo’s recognition by Serbia along with determining state borders/administrative lines.
Here, so far the attitudes of experts have been clear regarding clearing issues of the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The process has been supported by the EU and the USA from the beginning, but there are differences regarding the way of realising that process. Up until now, theoretically two possible solutions have been possible: The first is the formal and complete recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by the Republic of Serbia. The second, narrowed recognition form would follow the Basic Treaty between West and East Germany from 1972 (known as the model of “Two Germanies“). With regard to Priština, the “Platform" has narrowed the whole issue to only one possibility only, the full, complete and unconditional "mutual" recognition of the two states. Thereby it is unclear for Belgrade why the recognition of Serbia by Kosovo is important, when Serbia presents a “notorious international fact.”
However, from the standpoint of international relations, and the consequences of the existing highlighting from Washington that they “do not exclude moving the border between Serbia and Kosovo, although they do not favour it,” as well as “flirting" with changing borders in this sense by a not small number of political circles within the EU – especially the right and radical ones who are entering the election processes aggressively in their states and in the EU alike – advocating such a resolution of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo becomes highly dangerous.
It is known that, when it comes to issues regarding resolving key problems in Europe, there has almost never been a “single voice" from Brussels and Washington. There is none today in the case of Serbia and Kosovo. One of the reasons for that is that by the arrival of President Donald Trump as the head of the US administration, a new approach of so-called “flexibility” is being implemented, i. e. Belgrade and Priština are given space to achieve “the best possible agreement.“ Such an attitude has served the political propaganda machinery of Serbia’s government to create an atmosphere in the public suggesting that the USA supports the correction of Kosovo’s borders if the two sides come to an agreement regarding this. However, the reaction is not like this in Kosovo as well. On the other side, the EU, and especially Germany, has remained true to the principle of territorial integrity.
It is clear that Vučić attempted to continue backstage attempts of avoiding the complete and formal international recognition of Kosovo in its existing borders. The intention was to keep looking for various other solutions that will not simultaneously disrupt Serbia’s way into the EU. Without any dilemma, Kosovo strived exclusively for full recognition – at any price. Even without regarding their further way towards the Stabilization and Association Agreement, as the first step towards the EU. They do not hide that here they expect the full support of the USA and Trump. The European Commission in its current convocation, even with public declarations, neither has a unique position nor the strength to persevere in (their own) Brussels dialogue. Shortly, everyone hopes for the elections and opening a new longer and bigger space for continuing the process. With all possible risks for the state of relations between Serbia and Kosovo and the whole region alike.
However, in this moment the “state in the region,” as one of the important elements of the issue with Belgrade and Priština, like communicating vessels with the games over there, the interest of the USA and the impotence of the EU, is already upsetting the public and producing effects that deliberately are in the function of preparing the “people" for territorial rearrangements that do not need to be directly connected to the initial ignitor: Vučić, along with the familiar sweet-talk, how supposedly no one should even remotely suspect bad intentions in Belgrade when inviting “the representatives of all Serbs from our part of the Balkans,” from Republika Srpska, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro… And in the beginning of the year he expressed his distinct pleasure how “a level of concord has been reached with Serb representatives in the region that has not existed in decades.” Together with him at the meeting with “Serbs from the region,” there also was the President of Serbia’s Government, Ana Brnabić. Dodik was thrilled when informing everyone that "Republika Srpska is the synonym for freedom, and Serbia for our life, this is how we behave and we wish to legalise such an approach..." President Vučić swore on Dayton on this occasion as well, and thus also on the unquestionable BiH, and only a few days earlier Minister of Foreign Affairs Dačić publically declared how for them "Republika Srpska is more important than Kosovo.” Prime Minister Brnabić further opened visions two months ago and, smoothly connecting Kosovo and BiH with an even more significant statement: “It is obvious that the borders are on the table and now we have it that for some (Kosovo and Albania) they might be opened, and not for Republika Srpska and Serbia..." A few days later, in Banja Luka, the Prime Minister was awarded a high order of the RS, once presented to Karadžić, Mladić, and the like.
The provocation was inspired by rumours about abolishing borders between Albania and Kosovo. One could even here news about “expanding" this scenario to Macedonia as well, probably also to Montenegro. In Macedonia, the panic had barely subsided when the local Albanian party Besa, from whose several votes the election results in Sobranje depended then, threatened not to vote for the ratification of the agreement between Skopje and Athens on changing Macedonia’s name and entering NATO, unless a formulation on the statehood of Albanians in Macedonia is included in the Constitution. They did not obtain quite “statehood,” but they did get the promise of a change within the Constitution whereby they will be treated inside a new formulation stating “all peoples living in Macedonia.” Still, what is even more important is the formulation according to which Macedonia borders with the “state Kosovo.” A huge point for Kosovo, but also Albanians from the whole region.
The "Kosovo issue” is also shaking up Montenegro. There, the relationship between the government and the opposition is utterly fragile, and the influence of Albanians, especially in the south of the country, has been established well for long. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, any opening of borders in the region would be existentially dangerous, and voices regarding that are not weak. Croatia has a dispute regarding the demarcation in the sea and is not completing the identification of borders de facto with all of its neighbours. Their persistent requests on the ethnical electoral "territorialisation" along with the one-sidedly formulated request on amending the Election Law in BiH to that regard, is the introduction into more radical ideas on the change of territories. The highest leaders of Croatia, the state President and Prime Minister, do not cease to make constant pressure on the European political scene with regard to this as well, without any warning from there that this is a case of interfering with the internal affairs of another sovereign country. In that context, Dragan Čović, President of the HDZ BiH, was also a gladly seen guest of Milorad Dodik in Banja Luka, at the celebration of January 9, the unconstitutional “statehood” day of an entity that – is no state.
It has already been mentioned here that the total destabilisation of the situation in the area of Yugoslavia which was dissolved in blood, up until the continuation of that destruction in some of the newly-created states, presents one of the means for reaching the final goal of Vučić and Haradinaj. The first in order to completely prevent the recognition of Kosovo along with the continuation of the way into the EU. And the other for the international recognition at any price, possibly today, even if they do not approximate to Europe in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, no one with true power from outside demonstrates enough will and energy to interrupt this dangerous game. It would be naive to believe that the reason for this is that it is not possible. It appears more to be the upper version – maybe the Balkans needs to be “reopened" as an unfinished story and thereby many old interests in the domination over this region “put in order.” Changing borders seems like a good method to those interested. Anyhow, the Middle East is “closing,” and the Balkans are more and more openly classified in the context of an agreed “exchange" of interests in those two regions. If this is the case, the creation of animosity, hatred and fear is not surprising. That is how that goes. The rest what follows this in the Balkans is well-known. Any change of borders has always been just an introduction into bloody wars, not in the interest of the Balkans, but those who attempt to “geostrategically" rule the Balkans from the outside. All of that can still be prevented now, but that chance will not remain on the table for a long time.
It is interesting that during the time when the platform was adopted in Priština preventing any sort of negotiations with Serbia, the State Department warned that “the USA and the EU will not allow Russia to strengthen its influence in the Balkans.” In that sense, it is completely logical that the decision of the Kosovar Albanians and the messages from Washington and Brussels may be considering coordinated action, although the West claims that it cares for the stabilisation of relations and supposedly exerts pressure on Priština to abolish customs duties of 100% on merchandise from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Which Priština according to the “Platform" does not accept!
Platform for negotiations with Serbia
What are the most significant terms of the “Platform for negotiations with Serbia?”
- “The borders of Kosovo have been declared as inviolable,” meaning the “preservation of Kosovo in the state on February 17, 2008,” from the date of the self-proclaimed independence of the Kosovar Albanians.
- The abolition of Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council is requested, as well as the creation of a court for Serbs who participated in the armed conflicts in Kosovo.
- Any agreement proposed for signing to Priština “needs to be in line with the Kosovo Constitution.”
- The document does not mention the requests of Serbia, the United States and the EU to abolish the Kosovo customs duties of 100% on the import of merchandise from Serbia and BiH, which is one of the conditions of Belgrade to continue the dialogue.
- The legally binding final agreement shall enter into force only after Serbia recognises Kosovo as an independent and sovereign country, when a referendum is held regarding the agreement in Kosovo and when both states are ratified by the agreement.”
- Prevent the loss of the lake Gazivode and the mine Trepča in the north of the country, and all property located in Kosovo belongs exclusively to Kosovo and this is non-negotiable.
It is clear from the whole context that the document was compiled in agreement with Washington and Brussels, although mild statements come from these two centres how earlier reached agreements regarding the continuation of unconditional negotiations need to be respected. Vučić stated clearly immediately after the publication of the “Platform" that this presents a “dangerous provocation meaning the termination of all further negotiations.”
At the same time, Washington sent out the message that it is working together with Brussels on a strategy of countering Russia in the Balkans. This statement was made by Matthew Palmer during his Zagreb visit on March 7, the Deputy Assistant Secretary at U.S. Department of State - Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. He expressed hope that all “necessary steps will be taken to suspend the customs duties and return the partners to the negotiation table.” Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj repeated that the customs duties shall not be abolished before the complete recognition of Kosovo by Belgrade.
Palmer said in Zagreb that it is “possible that comprehensive agreements will include changes of borders between Serbia and Kosovo. The United States do not favour such changes, but they do not exclude them. It is our goal to facilitate the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the normalisation of relations based on the mutual recognition of both sides.”
Any change of borders in the Balkans might, perhaps, in some isolated strategic interest from the side, achieve some partial goal, but it is quite clear that much more realistic consequences of such a move in the Balkans would be chain reactions with new requests for other cases of opening borders with a final effect – bloody war on many fronts. Unfortunately, this has never concerned the “big players.”